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I. APPELLATE JURISDICTION
s

Jurisdiction is proper in this Court pursuant to Utah Code Ann. § 78-2a-3(2)(h) and

pursuant to Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure 3.
II. STATEMENT OF ISSUES PRESENTED ON APPEAL
A.

Should the trial court have modified the permanent award of alimony set forth

in the original divorce decree.
1.

Standard of Review

Question of fact that the court reviews for abuse of discretion. Willey v. Willey, 951
P.2d 226, 230 (Utah 1997), Moon v. Moon, 973 P.2d 431 (Utah 1990)
III. CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS
There are no constitutional provisions at issue in this case.
IV. STATUTORY PROVISIONS
Utah Code Ann. § 30-3-5(8)(g)(i) which provides as follows:
The court has continuing jurisdiction to make substantive changes and new orders regarding
alimony based on a substantial material change in circumstances not foreseeable at the time
of the divorce.
V. RULES PROVISION
There are no court rules at issue in this case.
VI. S T A T E M E N T OF T H E CASE
A.

N A T U R E OF T H E CASE

1

This is an appeal from a bench trial held March 2, 2004 in regards to a petition to
modify a divorce decree submitted by the Respondent for the purposes of terminating the
amount of alimony paid to the Petitioner. The case was heard before Judge L. A. Dever in
the Third Judicial District Court, Salt Lake County, State of Utah.
B.

COURSE OF PR OCEEDINGS

The original Decree of Divorce as entered June 8, 1998. The Petition to Modify was
filed March 2, 2003. The order which terminated the alimony was entered April 30, 2004.
C.

DISPOSITION AT TRIAL COURT

The trial court granted Respondent's request to modify the original divorce decree
arid completely eliminated the $700 alimony payment to the Respondent as of March 2,
2004.
RELEVANT FACTS
Christine C. Smith (Petitioner) and Alan B. Smith (Respondent) were divorced on
June 8, 1998, after 29 years of marriage (R83-88). Judge Wilkinson presided over the
original divorce. Towards the end of their marriage, the Respondent required a
substantial amount of medical care in regards to his mental health issues. Respondent
prohibited the Petitioner from using joint income to pay for the medical bills. (R212, p.20)
Petitioner spent $70,000, almost all of her inheritance, to pay the bills associated with the
medical care received by the Respondent (R212, p.21). The original divorce decree
called for a division of wealth based on the length of the marriage and the economic
circumstances between the parties. (R781f 2, R84 ^[3, R212, p.22). The economic
2

circumstances were the length of marriage (29 years), the Petitioner had quit college and
worked to support the Respondent as he went through college, she then became a stay at
home mom raising three children rather than pursuing her career, she's used her
inheritance to pay for the medical needs of the Respondent such that her inheritance was
basically lost, the Petitioner was just starting a career and the Petitioner's earning
capacity. The Petitioner had just begun working as a nurse (R212, p. 16) and was making
$2,154 per month (R212, p.6; R77 ^J5). It was anticipated that as she progressed in her
career that her income would increase. She discussed her anticipated increase in income
with Judge Wilkinson prior to his issuing the divorce decree (R212,p. 17 & 25).
Judge Wilkinson ordered the Respondent to permanently pay $700 a month (R35
PI5). The divorce decree left the Petitioner without any 401(k) funds (R212, p.20; R84
f4). The Petitioner had taken a non liquid asset, the home, in exchange for the 401(k) in
order to provide a home for her and the children. (Note: the children were over the age of
18.) The Respondent was living with his mother when the Decree of Divorce was entered
and also at the time of trial on the petition. The fact that the Petitioner spent almost all of
her inheritance in taking care of the Respondent for his medical needs, which Judge
Wilkinson considered separate property, when there were marital assets which would
have been used, which the Respondent refused to allow to be used, and that the Petitioner,
in receiving the home would not have available to her liquid assets as would the
Respondent, Judge Wilkinson made the award of alimony permanent. (R84 f2; R212,p.
20-24). Because the Petitioner was just starting her career and it was known
3

and anticipated that her income would increase and to make up for what she had lost,
Judge Wilkinson ordered that the only change which could occur in modifying the
alimony award would be a modification in the Respondent's income/benefits. Judge
Wilkinson ordered as follows:
"If unforeseen circumstances occur as to the amount of income
received by the respondent, because of changes in his disability and/or
changes in his disability income that the same shall be a basis for modification
and/or review of the alimony as the court deems appropriate at the time and
under the circumstances that exist at the time of occurrence of the substantial
change of circumstances. (R84 ^[3; R211, p. 5)
The original divorce decree contained references to the Petitioner's school loans
for her recently completed nursing school (R84, ^f 4; R211, p. 4).
Petitioner is 54 years old (R212, p.28). She has just recently been able to begin to
save money in a 401(k) in anticipation of her retirement (R212, p.20). At the time of the
divorce the Petitioner was making $2154 a month, before taxes. (R84 ^f 2). She is now
making $4,333 a month, before taxes. Even though Petitioner's income has increased, the
Respondent's net income is still greater than the Petitioner's net income by $300 per
month. (R212, p. 54 and Exhibit F)
None of the above facts were disputed or contested by the Respondent.
Respondent asked the court to modify the divorce decree citing a substantial material
change in circumstances that was unforeseen at the time of the divorce, which he solely
identified as the increase in income to the Petitioner.
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It was this increase in income which Judge Dever used to terminate the alimony.
Judge Dever determined that the Petitioner had a 92% increase in income while the
Respondent had only a 5% increase in income and that increase was sufficient to establish
a substantial material change in circumstances. (R198) In modifying the permanent
award, Judge Dever used the language in Bollinger v. Bollinger, 997 P.2d 903 (Ut. App.
2000) to define when a change in circumstances was foreseeable at the time of the
divorce. Judge Dever's restrictive definition in Bollinger requires that a circumstance be
expressly stated in the record or in the divorce decree itself for it to be considered
foreseeable. Though markedly different than the language of the statute, the definition
was adopted by the court to prevent the court from having to be forced to try to resolve
disputes about what was said or contemplated prior to the issuing of a divorce decree.
However, in applying this restrictive definition, Judge Dever limited his inquiry to the
divorce decree and part of the transcript of the stipulation of the parties at the time of the
decree. In this case, however, there wasn't a dispute as to what was meant by the
language offfi[2and 3 of the Decree of Divorce (R84). Judge Dever did not take into
account the undisputed evidence presented at trial by both parties nor the part of the
transcript of the stipulation of the parties which limited changes in the alimony only upon
changes to Respondent's income/benefits (R211, p.5). As a result, Judge Dever found
that there was a substantial material change in circumstances that was unforeseen at the
time of the divorce. Judge Dever then revoked the permanent award of alimony that was
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set forth in the original decree, thereby relieving Respondent of all future payments.
(R197-199).

SUMMARY OF ARGUMENTS
The Appellate Court has jurisdiction to modify a trial court's modification of
alimony when a trial court abuses its discretion. The trial court judge abused his
discretion in two ways in this case. First, by finding that the Petitioner's increase in
income was an unforeseen change circumstance, despite the undisputed evidence that the
Petitioner's future increase in income was discussed with the trial judge and the
Respondent. Second, the order terminating the alimony created a serious inequity by
eliminating an award of alimony that was made permanent in the original decree because
the Petitioner spent her inheritance, $70,000, to pay the Respondent's medical bills,
Respondent's net income is still greater than that of the Petitioner, and the economic
circumstance which were the basis for the permanent award still exist. In the alternative,
this court should adopt an exception to the stringent requirement of Bollinger and allow
the court to consider a change in circumstance to be foreseen when the evidence is
undisputed that such a change was contemplated at the time of the original divorce
decree. This exception should also be made because the instant action was decided prior
to the court ruling in Bollinger.
ARGUMENT
THIS COURT SHOULD FIND THAT THE TRIAL COURT ABUSED ITS
DISCRETION BY MODIFYING A PERMANENT AWARD OF ALIMONY THAT

6

WAS BASED ON EQUITY AND FOR REASONS THAT WERE FORESEEABLE AT
THE TIME OF THE DIVORCE; OR IN THE ALTERNATIVE, ADOPT A LESS
RESTRICTIVE DEFINITION OF WHAT IT MEANS FOR A CIRCUMSTANCE TO
BE CONSIDERED FORESEEABLE.

POINT I
The Appellate Court Can Reverse The Trial Court's Alimony
Award When The Trial Court Abuses It Discretion.
A trial court maintains continuing jurisdiction over alimony awards and can make
future modifications as appropriate. Utah Code Ann. § 30-3-5(3) (1989), Johnson v.
Johnson, 855 P.2d 250 (Ut. Ct. App 1993). If a trial court abuses its discretion when it
modifies a divorce decree, the appellate court can reverse the trial court's actions. Willey
v. Willey, 951 P.2d 226, 230 (Ut. 1997). The Appellate Court will not disturb the trial
court's alimony award so long as the trial court exercises its discretion within the
standards set by the appellate courts." Haumont v. Haumont, 793 P.2d 421, 423 (Ut.
Ct.App.1990).
POINT II
The Trial Court Abused Its Discretion By Failing to
Acknowledge that the Petitioner's Increased Earning Potential
Was Foreseeable at the Time of the Divorce and that the
Principles of Equity Require that the Original Award of
Alimony be Permanent
Utah law gives courts continuing jurisdiction over a divorce and allows courts to
"make substantive changes and new orders regarding alimony based on a substantial
material change in circumstances not foreseeable at the time of the divorce." Utah Code
Ann. § 30-3-5(8)(g)(i). After wrongly determining that the Petitioner's increase in income
7

was unforeseeable and ignoring the fact that the alimony was designated permanent in
equitable considerations including the fact that the Petitioner spent her inheritance to pay
the Respondent's medical bills, the trial court reduced the amount of alimony.
a.
The undisputed testimony makes it clear that Petitioner's increase in
income was foreseen at the time of the divorce.
In Bollinger, the court said that "it is axiomatic that parties to a divorce decree will
experience some type of economic change after the original divorce decree is entered, the
change, if substantial, will support a modification to the decree only if it was not foreseen
at the time of the divorce decree." Bollinger v. Bollinger 997 P.2d 903, 908 (Utah App.
2000) Similarly, the court in Dana said, "a change in circumstances reasonably
contemplated at the time of divorce is not legally cognizable as a substantial change in
circumstances in modification proceedings." Dana v. Dana, 789 P.2d 726, 729 (Utah
App. 1990).
In the instant case, it was well known by both parties at the time of the divorce that
the Petitioner had just finished nursing school and was starting her career as a nurse. The
Petitioner's education and her starting a new career as a nurse were discussed with Judge
Wilkinson in arriving at the parties's stipulation. The divorce decree contained specific
references to loans that the Petitioner took out to finance her recently completed
education to prepare her for her nursing career. At the time of the divorce, the
Petitioner's job as a nurse provided most of her a monthly income of $2,154. It was
foreseeable and contemplated by the Respondent and the court when the parties entered
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into their stipulation that the Petitioner would experience an increase in her income as she
continued to work as a nurse.
The Petitioner's education and hard work at a job that she had just begun at the
time of her divorce has resulted in an increase of income during the past 6 years. This
natural progression was not only foreseeable at the time of the divorce, it was discussed
by the parties and the judge; therefore it should not be considered grounds for modifying
a permanent alimony award. The "foreseeable" increase was why Judge Wilkinson ruled
that the only basis to modify the alimony award would be changes in the Respondent's
income/benefits. (R84 ^3). This paragraph fl[3) of the Divorce Decree was completely
ignored by the Judge Dever in making his ruling.
b.
The trial court should not have modified the award of alimony because
it was based on principles of equity and was designed to be permanent.
The Court of Appeals can reverse a trial court's decision concerning alimony when
the trial court's decision upon showing that such serious inequity has resulted as to
manifest clear abuse of discretion. Rudman v. Rudman, 1991, 812 P.2d 73 (Utah App.Ct.
1991). The trial court in this case failed to consider the past economic circumstances of
the parties and created a serious inequity when it modified a permanent award of alimony.
Such inequity is grounds for reversal.
The original divorce decree clearly stated that it was based on "the economic
circumstances between the parties." The unrebutted testimony made it clear that among
the economic circumstances considered were that Petitioner had quit college and worked
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to support Respondent as he went through school getting his college degrees, she had
been a stay at home mom, she was just starting a new career, the length of the parties'
marriage, that her income was low but was anticipated to increase, Petitioner was
receiving a non liquid asset (the home) while Respondent received a liquid asset (the
401k), and the fact that the Petitioner spent her inheritance, $70,000, to pay the
Respondent's medical bills because the Respondent refused to allow marital assets to be
spent on his care. The Petitioner's inheritance was considered by Judge Wilkinson to be
separate property under Utah law and, if it had not been used to pay the Respondent's
medical bills, would have been hers to retain at the time of the divorce. See Burke v.
Burke, 733 P.2d 133, 134 (Ut. 1987) (Stating that premarital property, gifts, and
inheritances may be viewed as separate property, and in appropriate circumstances, equity
will require that each party retain the separate property brought to the marriage). As a
result of the expenditure of separate property for the benefit of the Respondent, and the
Respondent receiving all of the 401(k), the original trial court ordered permanent alimony
to be paid to the Petitioner. Any reduction of an award that was intended to be
permanent and that was based on one spouse's substantial expenditure for the sole benefit
of the other spouse is exceedingly inequitable.
The original divorce decree provides additional evidence that the amount of
alimony was intended to be permanent and not dependent on the amount of the
Petitioner's income. The original divorce decree contained a provision for adjusting the
alimony should the benefits/income received by the Respondent change.
10

"If unforeseen circumstances occur as to the amount of income received by the
respondent, because of changes in his disability and/or changes in his
disability income that the same shall be a basis for modification and/or review
of the alimony as the court deems appropriate at the time and under the
circumstances that exist at the time of occurrence of the substantial change of
circumstances." (R84 ^[3)
Because the amount of alimony to be paid was not dependent on the Petitioner's
income, no such provision was made in the divorce decree for changes to the amount of
the alimony should the Petitioner's income increase or decrease. Even with the
Petitioner's increase in income, the Respondent is still receiving more net income than the
Petitioner by $300.00 per month.
The trial court's abuse of discretion created a serious inequity by modifying the
permanent award of alimony. This court should reverse the decision and restore the
Petitioner's award of alimony.
POINT III
Because the Testimony About What Was Contemplated at the
Time of the Divorce is Undisputed the Court Should Follow the
Plain Language of the Statute and Not Use Such a Restrictive
Definition for What is Considered Foreseeable.
The Respondent points to Bollinger to assert that a change in circumstances is not
foreseen unless it is stated in the record or in the divorce decree itself. The genesis of this
interpretation in Bollinger comes from Johnson v. Johnson, 855 P.2d 250. The court in
Johnson was concerned about the difficulty of resolving old arguments about what was or
was not contemplated or foreseen in a divorce decree at the time of the divorce. Stating
"we do not believe it makes for good law or sound policy to have parties arguing years
11

years after the fact over what a trial court may or may not have considered when making
an alimony award." Id at 253
However, this case is different than Johnson and Bollinger. The parties are not
arguing over what was considered at the time of the divorce. The evidence in this case is
undisputed about what was discussed and foreseen prior to the construction of the original
divorce decree. In cases like this, where the evidence about what was foreseen and
contemplated at the time of the divorce is undisputed, there is no need for the court to
adopt such a rigid and singular test for proving what was contemplated in the original
decree. By creating an exception for cases where the evidence is undisputed, the court
could create more just outcomes while still avoiding the entanglements of disputes over
what was and was not foreseen at the time of the original decree.
Because there is undisputed evidence that the Petitioner's future increase in
income was foreseen and discussed prior to the court issuing the original divorce decree,
this court should use a more literal definition of foreseeable and not require that the
circumstance actually be discussed in the divorce decree to be considered foreseeable.
CONCLUSION
The Appellate Court can reverse a trial court's decision when it does not exercise
its discretion within the established standards. The trial court violated one standard by
modifying a decree based on circumstances that were foreseeable. The trial court also
violated a standard by creating a result that led to a serious inequity. Accordingly, this
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court should reverse the trial court's decision and restore the Petitioner's award of
#

*x

alimony.
DATED this2j2_ day of November , 2004.

Attorney for PeTrtroher and Appellant
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EXHIBIT A

Copy
" " D W 5 T W C T COURT
Third Judicial District

Randy S.Ludlow #2011
Attorney for Petitioner
336 South 300 East, Suite 200
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111
Telephone: (801) 531-1300
Fax. (801) 322-1628

JUN - J 1998
Deputy Cleric

IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT IN AND FOR
SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH
CHRISTINE CORLEISSEN SMITH,

DECREE OF DIVORCE

Petitioner,
vs.

Case No. 974900256DA

ALAN BRUCE SMITH,

Judge Homer F. Wilkinson

Respondent.

THE ABOVE ENTITLED MATTER came on for pretrial on the 30th day of October, 1997
before the Honorable Homer F. Wilkinson, judge of the above entitled court. The petitioner was
present and represented by her attorney of record, Randy S. Ludlow. The respondent was present
and represented by his attorney of record, Jane Allen. The court having previously entered its
Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law and now, based upon such and for good cause appearing
herein

IT IS HEREBY ORDERED, ADJUDGED AND DECREED as follows:
1. The petitioner is awarded a Decree of Divorce from the respondent which Decree shall
becomefinalupon entry.
2. Based upon the length of the marriage, the economic circumstances between the parties
including the respondent's disability it is appropriate that there be an equalization of income. The
respondent is to pay to the petitioner the sum of $698.00 per month as alimony based upon her total
monthly income of $2,154 and the respondents total monthly income of $3,546.00 per month. The
alimony as to be paid herein is a permanent alimony.
3. If unforseen circumstances occur as to the amount of income received by the respondent,
because of changes in his disability and/or changes in his disability income that the same shall be a
basis for modification and/or review of the alimony as the court deems appropriate at the time and
under the circumstances that exist at the time of occurrence of the substantial change of
circumstances.
4. The Northwest Pipeline 401k has a value of approximately $190,000. The parties are to
withdraw from that account sufficient funds to pay in their entirety the debts and obligations owing
on the second mortgage of approximately $8,499, the Westminster-Perkins Loan of $228.00, the
Stafford Loan of approximately $20,000, the SLS Loan of approximately $2,112.00, the University
of Utah Credit Union Loan of $4,758 and the MasterCard of approximately $7,350.00 together with
sufficient funds to pay the taxes from the money withdrawn from said account. The parties will

00005197.98
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thereafter file a joint tax return for the year 1997 with the parties being jointly responsible for the
taxes upon said tax return.
The remaining 401k having a value of approximately $125,000 is such that the remaining
amount would be solely owned and held by the respondent on him transferring and giving over to the
petitioner all equity in the parties' home together with $5,000. The respondent would be solely
responsible for all tax liabilities associated with the remaining balance on the 401k with Northwest
Pipeline. As a result of the transfers contained in the Decree it would equalize the accounts between
the parties.
5. The petitioner is awarded as her sole and separate property the Prudential and AT&T
accounts together with all of her inheritances, her IRA's and her 401k free and clear of any claim by
the respondent.
The respondent is to be awarded the IRA of the petitioner's which is in the sum of $3,800 free
and clear of any claim by the petitioner.
6. The petitioner is awarded one-half (Vi) of all retirements, pension plans, annuities which
have been acquired by the respondent and a Qualified Domestic Relations Order shall issue for the
distribution of the same.
7. The parties have two accounts which have been maintained for the parties' child, Beth's,
education. Those accounts are at the University of Utah Credit Union in the sum of approximately
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$4,000 and a Certificate of Deposit at the University of Utah Credit Union in the sum of
approximately $5,200. Those items will remain for the parties' child's education solely.
8. The parties have obtained insurances during the course ofthe marriage. The petitioner will
remain as the beneficiary on the Oldline life insurance policy which has a face value of approximately
$100,000, policy number 5 1364551L, which is insuring the life of the respondent.
The parties will be joint beneficiaries on the Oldline life insurance policy which has a face
value of $40,000 policy number 5 1689739L which insures the petitioner. If the parties jointly decide
to surrender the $40,000 policy they shall do the same pursuant to a written agreement and equally
divide the surrender value of said policy.
9. The home and real property that was acquired during the marriage by the parties and is
more particularly described as follows:
Lot 13, Lazy Bar No. 2 Subdivision, according to the official plat thereof onfileand
of record in the Salt Lake County Recorder's Office.
is awarded to the petitioner free and clear of any claim by the respondent. The petitioner is to pay
thefirstmortgage owing upon the real property and to hold the respondent harmlessfromthe same.
10. Each party shall be responsible for their own attorneys fees and costs incurred in this
matter.
11. Each party is awarded those items of personal property they presently hold in their
possession free and clear of any claim by the other.

00005197.98
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12. The petitioner is awarded the automobile in her possession together with the debt and
obligation owing against the same.
13. The respondent is awarded the truck presently in his possession free and clear of any
claim by the petitioner.
14. Each party is required to sign any and all documents necessary to carry out the terms and
provisions of the Decree of Divorce.
DATED this

^

day oFMatch, 1998.
BY THE COUR

00005197.98
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MAILING CERTIFICATE
I hereby certify that I caused to be mailed a true and correct copy of the foregoing
FINDINGS OF FACT AND CONCLUSIONS OF LAW and DECREE OF DIVORCE, by placing
the same in the United States Mail, in a postage prepaid sealed envelope, this ' 2 ^ 3 o a y of April,
1998.
JANE ALLEN
310 SOUTH MAIN #1305
SALT LAKE CITY, UTAH 84101
ALAN BRUCE SMITH
225 SOUTH CAMPUS
OREM, UTAH 84057
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EXHIBIT B

COPY
t\

AFr. 3 0 2004
^

By

s

w.

SALT LAtfE CCUNTY
Dcf.uiy CSork

IN THE THIRD DISTRICT COURT IN AND FOR THE
STATE OF UTAH, SALT LAKE COUNTY,
SALT LAKE DEPARTMENT

CHRISTINE COREISSEN SMITH,
Plaintiff,

ORDER
Civil No. 97 490 0256 DA

vs.

ALAN BRUCE SMITH,
Defendant.

JUDGE L. A. DEVER

This matter came before the Court on March 2, 2004, on Defendant's Petition
to Modify. The parties were present and represented by Counsel. The Court heard
testimony, received documentary evidence and heard argument of counsel.
The law grants to the Court the authority to modify a divorce decree. The test
is whether there has been a substantial material change in circumstances justifying

such modification. Not only must there be a substantial change in circumstances, but
it must be one not contemplated at the time of the divorce decree.
When the parties divorced the plaintiffs income was $2154.00 a month and
the defendant's income was $3546.00 a month.
The evidence, at the hearing, established that the plaintiffs income has risen to
$4192.00 a month, a 92% increase from the time of the divorce. Additionally, the
evidence showed that her expenses had declined. The defendant's income since the
divorce has risen to $3742.00 a month, an increase of approximately 5%. The
difference in the increases is, by itself, sufficient to establish a substantial material
change in circumstances.
Was the substantial increase in the income of the plaintiff foreseen at the time
of the divorce? A review of the Findings of Fact, the Decree and the transcript of the
stipulation of the parties does not establish that future income from nursing was
considered by the parties.
Case law is clear on the issue of foreseeability. There must be some evidence
in the record of consideration of the possible effect of the change or it will be viewed
as unanticipated and therefore available for consideration as a change of
circumstances.
The Court finds that there has been an unanticipated change of circumstances

and that the change has been substantial warranting a conclusion that alimony should
be terminated. Alimony to the plaintiff is terminated effective March 2, 2004.

Dated this 30m day of April, 2004.

BY THE COURT

CERTIFICATE OF MAILING
I hereby certify that on the 30th day of April, 2004,1 caused a true and correct copy
of the foregoing Order to be mailed by United States mail, postage prepaid, to the
following:
Randy S. Ludlow
185 South State St, Ste 208
Salt Lake City, UT 84111
Stephen J. Buhler
3540 South 4000 West, Ste 245
West Valley City, UT 84120

EXHIBIT C

CHRISTINE & ALAN SMITH
COMPARISON OF NET INCOME
2003
ALAN SMITH
Social Security

$19,352.40

Williams

$26,251.20

Gross

$45,603.60

Medicare

$(704.40)

Fed Income Tax

$(1,371.42) withheld
$1,170 .00 refund (2002)

State Income Tax

$(980.52) withheld
$740.00 refund (2002)

Net annual income

$44,457.26

Net monthly

$3,704.77

CHRISTINE SMITH
Monthly (based on $25.00/hr)

$4,333.00

Federal (based on 3 exemptions)

($391.00)

State

($184.00)

FICA & Medicare

($335.00)

Net Monthly

$3,423.00
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